Hyde, Amacher, and Magrath (1996) 
The authors push their argument too far, however, in three instances: first, in downplaying the potential inefficiencies associated with deforestation; second, in stating that "forest rent is seldom large" (p. 240); and third, in minimizing the economic importance of rent allocation between public owners and private users. In so doing they may have led readers to conclude that policymakers in developing countries and their advisers need not be concerned about deforestation or timber rents. In our view, such a conclusion is far off the mark.
Deforestation
The authors make several provocative assertions about deforestation. In particular, they claim that capitalized forest values net of "the costs of establishing and protecting permanent rights to the land" are "generally" negative (p. 226), and that the capitalized values of "most remaining tropical forests" are negative even if one ignores the costs of establishing property rights (p. 227). They offer no empirical evidence to support these assertions. This is a critical omission. If the assertions are true, then it follows that the degradation and conversion of open-access tropical forests to other uses do not generate significant efficiency losses. In effect, the authors assert away the essential economic concern about deforestation.
They also implicitly assume that individuals, households, communities, and firms face few obstacles in converting land that does have a positive value in forestry uses from de jure or de facto open-access to private or communal ownership (pp. 225-7, 229) . If that is true, then property rights and land markets might indeed emerge in an efficient manner over time, and deforestation might not be associated with significant inefficiencies. We agree that rural areas are much more marketized than is popularly supposed. But the efficiency of markets depends critically on the existence of well-defined, enforced property rights. In the case of plantation forestry investments in Chile, cited more than once by the authors to illustrate the presumed insignificance of policies relative to market adjustments, markets did not work their magic until the government assured potential investors that forests would not be nationalized (Vincent and Binkley 1992) . In many other developing countries, including the world's two leading tropical timber producers, Indonesia and Malaysia, the ownership of forests by parties other than the state is (or was until recently) prohibited.
Without secure legal rights to forest land, economic agents are understandably reluctant to make the investments in forest management or forest plantations that are necessary for dynamically efficient forest-sector development. The authors dismiss such problems as "delays," stating that "there is no empirical evidence of their economic importance" (p. 236). But they provide no empirical evidence to demonstrate that institutional obstacles and the "delays" they generate are not important. Indeed, on pp. 238-39 they provide several examples of policy distortions that prob-ably do generate significant inefficiencies. Others are outlined in one of the articles they cite (Gillis 1988a) .
Surely governments ought to be concerned about removing obstacles to the development of efficient land markets (see Repetto and Gillis 1988, Vincent and Binkley 1992) . The observation that deforestation might not "attain its physical limit" (p. 223) is not very reassuring from a social welfare standpoint: the cumulative amount and rate of deforestation might still be far above socially efficient levels.
The Magnitude of Timber Rents
Timber rent is the return over and above the factor costs of logging: the difference between total revenue from timber sales and total costs of harvesting and delivery (including a normal profit margin, but excluding the fees charged by the government in the form of taxes, licenses, and so forth). In light of evidence from the literature and from the field, the authors' claim that "forest rent is seldom large" (p. 240) is astonishing. Many studies conducted since the 1970s have documented the existence of large rents in the virgin or semi-virgin (logged over, but with residual virgin trees) forests that have been the locus of most commercial logging in developing countries (Page, Pearson, and Leland 1976; Ruzicka 1979; Gillis 1980; Repetto and Gillis 1988; Vincent 1990; Sizer and Rice 1995; Sizer 1996) . The authors cite almost none of this literature. In fact, they appear convinced that such rents simply cannot exist, commenting that "Surely all private operators would have had sufficient incentive to harvest each year all the way to the geographic point where their access and harvest costs depleted the entire value of the standing resource" (p. 240).
There are several reasons why large rents can, and indeed do, exist in many tropical forests. The first comes from basic theory. An old-growth timber stock is like a deposit of a nonrenewable resource. When a nonrenewable resource is depleted at an optimal rate, its marginal rent (the rent on the last unit extracted in a given period) rises over time at a rate equal to the discount rate (the return on an alternative investment). This reflects the rising cost of depletion as the resource becomes more scarce, and it provides the fundamental economic reason why a rational user concerned with future as well as present returns will not harvest "all the way to the geographic point. . . ." The only difference in the case of forestry is that the rate of increase in the marginal rent (which forest economists call stumpage values) diminishes as logging proceeds and more vigorously growing, second-growth forests, which offer a biological rate of return because of growth, replace old-growth forests, which have no net timber growth.
Contrary to the authors' claims, long-run data on stumpage values do exist (for instance, see the sources in Vincent 1988 and Nordhaus 1992) , and they are broadly consistent with this theoretical story. For example, softwood stumpage values in the U.S. South rose in real terms by 4.6 percent a year from 1910 to 1943 and 3.1 percent a year from 1943 to 1985; they are predicted to rise at around 2 percent a year into the early 2000s (Binkley and Vincent 1988) . Should one be surprised that rents for tropical timber, whose products compete with ones made from temperate timber, are high today after a century of steadily rising values for temperate timber?
This theoretical explanation for large tropical timber rents is not entirely convincing, however. The absence of secure property rights in many developing countries implies that loggers do not make socially efficient decisions: in comparing the returns to current and future harvests, they place too little weight on the latter. In the extreme, if loggers completely ignore depletion costs, then harvesting will indeed proceed "all the way to the geographic point . . ." where marginal rent equals zero. If that is the case, where do large rents come from?
The first potential source is from timber within the margin: timber in forests with easy terrain and near roads, mills, and ports. Indeed, this "inframarginal" rent was the major source of the large timber rents in Malaysia estimated by Vincent (1990) . The possibility of large rents within the margin coexisting with rents equaling zero at the margin has been known since the time of classical economists such as Ricardo and von Thunen.
The second potential source of large rents is from government regulation of logging activity. Logging in Southeast Asia, the world's major source of tropical hardwood logs and products, is not completely uncontrolled. State and federal governments in Malaysia and Indonesia control access and utilization of the forest, although not perfectly, by issuing harvesting licenses, and by setting cutting limits at some minimum diameter. Such regulations prevent loggers from harvesting "all the way to the geographic point . . ." and result in positive rents at the harvesting margin.
Third, the expansion of infrastructure (logging roads, ports, and so forth), the development of lower-cost logging technologies, and increases in the number of species and sizes of roundwood accepted by markets have combined to increase rents over time. Such changes, which are typically not fully anticipated by timber markets, make rents available for loggers, concessionaires, and their political patrons. The authors downplay these changes as "specialized cases" of a return to "a relaxation of a restriction on forestry activity" (p. 240). Such changes do indeed relax restrictions on forestry activity, but they are far from occasional curiosities. Indeed, they have been the driving forces of the expansion of the tropical timber industry since the end of World War II.
1 Today, they are causing a historic shift of the industry from Southeast Asia to Latin America. It is unlikely that timber barons in Kuching and Jakarta will abandon their pursuit of concessions in Surinam, Guyana, and the Amazon after reading in Hyde, Amacher, and Magrath that tropical timber rents are no more than "relaxations of restrictions." Paraphrasing Gertrude Stein, a rent is a rent is a rent. Nor will Malaysian logging companies stop bidding as much as 40,000 ringgit a hectare ($16,000) for harvesting rights in peninsular Malaysia (Awang Noor 1996) .
In sum, there is no mystery why large rents are both theoretically possible and do in fact exist in many tropical timber-producing countries. Some of the evidence the authors present to deny this situation simply does not withstand scrutiny. For example, they imply that rents were low in the Philippines in the 1980s by juxtaposing the example of the Philippine's Bureau of Forestry Development, which lost money on its timber sales in the early 1980s (revenues from timber fees were less than the bureau's expenses), with that of below-cost timber sales in the United States. But timber fees were low in the Philippines not because rents were low, but because the bureau captured less than 10 percent of the available rents. Low rent capture, not low rent, was in fact the main point of the article by Boada (1988) that they cite.
The authors draw the forestry rent gradient in their figure 1 so that it "shows that" (p. 226) the value of forest land is low, but they could equally well have drawn it higher. The articles they cite lead us to speculate that the developing countries they had in mind in drawing this figure are ones whose commercial forests are a small proportion of total forests, such as China, India, Malawi, Nepal, Pakistan, and the Philippines. It is not surprising that average forest rents are low in such countries, which, because of ecological factors (low rainfall, say) or historical reasons (when considerable depletion has already occurred), do not have heavily stocked forests. But one should be wary of extrapolating from experience in such countries to the entire developing world, just as one should be wary of extrapolating from deserts to the global value of commercial agricultural land.
Allocation of Timber Rents
By contrasting two of our papers (Gillis 1988a; Vincent 1990 ) against two others (Paris and Ruzicka 1991; Hyde and Sedjo 1992) , Hyde, Amacher, and Magrath imply that we have argued that timber rents in public forests in developing countries are always large and always belong to the government, and that the assignment of these rents always has an efficiency impact. This is not an accurate representation of our work. Regarding the first claim, in Gillis (1988a) and Vincent (1990) , we emphasized that rent can vary substantially from stand to stand. Gillis (1988a; see also Gillis 1980 ) dealt explicitly with variations in rent within and between stands. As noted earlier, the model in Vincent (1990) was based on the existence of rent variation within the margin of utilization. Nor have we claimed that large rents in virgin forests imply that rents in second-growth forests, which are what matter for long-run land-use decisions, are also large. Vincent (1990) examined in great detail how the present value of net returns from second-growth harvests varies according to differences in prices, costs, rotation lengths, growth rates, and discount rates.
As for the second and third claims, we have never stated that the complete capture of resource rent by government agencies is necessary for efficient land-use allocation or efficient levels of forest management investments. Vincent (1993) cited quotations from our work emphasizing that many aspects of rent capture involve primarily distributional issues.
We, and others before us (Page, Pearson, and Leland 1976; Schmithüsen 1976; Ruzicka 1979) , have argued that the fees that forestry agencies levy to capture timber rents can affect marginal harvesting decisions and result in inefficient harvest levels if they are not set appropriately. This follows from basic concepts of resource taxation. Hyde and Sedjo (1992) accepted the validity of this point, although as noted in Vincent (1993) , they misinterpreted much of the analysis in Gillis (1980 Gillis ( , 1988a and Vincent (1990) .
Hyde, Amacher, and Magrath ignore this and several other potential links between government rent capture and efficiency within the forest sector. For example, Page, Pearson, and Leland (1976) pointed out that a government's failure to set timber fees at levels comparable to competitive stumpage values can destroy rents by artificially maintaining the viability of inefficient logging firms. (Gillis 1988a showed how industrial policies-high levels of protection to Indonesian plywood millsdestroyed rents by promoting inefficient local processing.) That timber fees can affect land-use decisions is evident from figure 1 in Hyde, Amacher, and Magrath: timber fees reduce the private return to forestry, shift the forest rent gradient downward, and thus reduce equilibrium forest area. Whether this effect is good or bad depends on the relative social returns to different land uses.
The allocation of rents from logging also has important implications beyond sectoral efficiency. One would expect national welfare to be enhanced if rents are retained within the country instead of being repatriated by transnational logging companies. Concerns about retained value triggered early studies on rent capture in the tropical timber sector, such as those by Page, Pearson, and Leland (1976) , Ruzicka (1979) , and Gillis (1980) . The authors cite none of those works. We seriously doubt that Papua New Guinea and the Latin American countries that are the new frontiers for tropical logging will be better off if they grant harvesting rights to Asian logging companies for a song.
The authors overlook a second link to national welfare: the potential efficiency gains that result from the state's ability to capture a higher proportion of timber rents and to reduce existing taxes that are more distortionary. If the authors doubt the significance of such measures, they should consider how low rates of rent capture in natural resource sectors have undermined economic recovery in Russia by forcing the state to impose crushing taxes on income, commercial transactions, and international trade. Indonesia and Malaysia, at the other extreme, have been able to keep general tax rates low because they generate revenue from petroleum (though not timber) rents.
The authors claim (note 4) that analyses of the impacts of general economic policies upon the forest sector are scant. In fact, several such analyses have long been available. The book Public Policies and the Misuse of Forest Resources (Repetto and Gillis 1988) not only highlighted failures in forestry policies, but it also discussed the effects of macroeconomic, trade, monetary, and agricultural policies on the forest sector. Indeed, Gillis (1988a) , which Hyde, Amacher, and Magrath cite, stressed these effects. Another chapter in the same volume depicted these effects in some detail for Ghana and several other African countries (Gillis 1988b) . Xie, Vincent, and Panayotou (1997) cited nearly 20 computable general equilibrium modeling studies showing the impacts of general economic policies on the forest sector.
In conclusion, it will be unfortunate if readers of the Research Observer conclude from Hyde, Amacher, and Magrath that deforestation and timber rents are not worthy of policymakers' attention. Both are associated with policy issues whose resolution could have important impacts on the efficiency of land use, forest managements, and economic growth in developing countries.
